The weeks leading up to the German elections on February 23, 2025 was marked with plenty of speculation concerning what the future would hold for German cannabis legalisation.
Among these was this conversation between Moritz Förster, editor-in-chief of Krautinvest.de, and René Repasi, an SPD member of the European Parliament, wherein the latest developments of cannabis policy in Germany and Europe are discussed. Repasi, who was also a professor of European law, comments on the challenges and opportunities of legalisation in the context of European law.
You can listen to the podcast below (in German), or follow along this full English transcript.
Summary of Developments in Cannabis Policy, Germany 2025
Germany’s ambitious plans for cannabis legalisation face significant hurdles. Pressure is not only felt from the conservative CDU/CSU’s desires to halt its implementation in the next legislative period, but also from within the European legal framework.
According to Repasi, while the SPD – together with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) & The Greens (Grüne), collectively known as the Traffic Light Coalition – remain committed to legalisation, current European law still views cannabis through a 20th-century lens, classifying it as an illegal drug. This creates a complex situation where full legalisation would likely face rejection from the European Court of Justice. The only foreseeable path to full legalisation would require a change to the European law itself. A big challenge here is any modification to existing laws needs a qualified majority, representing at least 55% of the EU member states. Currently, this threshold remains out of reach, with several member states maintaining conservative positions on cannabis policy.
Signs of Progress in Europe
A potential breakthrough could come through the European Commission’s upcoming evaluation of the 2004-757 framework decision on drug trafficking, with concrete proposals expected in 2026. One proposed solution involves creating an exemption clause allowing individual nations to legalize cannabis within their borders without disrupting the internal market. The Dutch “weed experiment,” permitting legal cannabis production and distribution in ten cities, serves as an interesting test case for other European nations. Meanwhile, Germany’s CanG legislation, focusing on decriminalisation, represents a significant step forward that the SPD intends to protect.
With the CDU/CSU in power, will CanG be withdrawn?
Repasi assured that the SPD would be willing to make concessions in coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU. He emphasizes that the CanG, which regulates decriminalisation, is not up for debate. He sees little room for more restrictive measures, as European law already sets strict limits. At most, “should it become more restrictive, it will most likely be within the framework of the CanG itself”. Furthermore, even if the CDU/CSU desire a complete return to the status quo before the CanG – actually doing so would be legally and practically difficult.
René Repasi on cannabis legalisation moving forward
Looking ahead, Repasi discloses that full legalisation might not be achievable until 2029-2030, contingent upon European approval and necessary adjustments to UN agreements. In the European Parliament, the situation is unpredictable, as support for legalisation does not follow party lines. A trial balloon in the form of an own-initiative report could help test the majorities. Repasi highlighted the importance of informal meetings initiated by Burkhard Blienert to convince Commission officials. A positive signal from the German coalition agreement could encourage the Commission to take further steps.
English Transcript of the Podcast
The transcript below starts 1:00 into the podcast.
Moritz Förster: What will happen in the next legislative period? Will the CanG be completely scrapped, as the CDU and CSU, for example, wish? Or will there be a legalisation of the entire value chain in compliance with European law, as the SPD has been demanding since its last party congress? Questions upon questions regarding cannabis. And who could answer all these questions better than our guest today? I am Moritz Förster, editor-in-chief of Krautinvest.de, and I warmly welcome René Repasi, a member of the European Parliament for the SPD.
René Repasi: Hello.
Moritz Förster: Nice to have you here. René, you have not only been an SPD party member since 1996, meaning you will celebrate your 30th anniversary next year, and a member of the European Parliament, but you were also a professor of European law. Against this background, how surprised were you when you saw the first key points paper of the traffic light coalition in October, I believe it was 2022? Yes, October 2022.
René Repasi: Well, after all, it was already part of our coalition agreement. It has long been part of the SPD’s position that this is what we want. However, that it will finally be implemented into government action was a positive point. We knew from the preparations that it would be a big challenge. Well, less so because of the majorities in Germany. We had scraped them together in the Traffic Light Coalition. But of course, because of the hurdles posed by European and international law. And yes, what then came from the Federal Ministry of Health pretty much explored what is possible. Accordingly, we got the break we needed to finally be able to take steps towards cannabis legalisation.
Moritz Förster: At that time, the entire value chain was to be legalized. Meanwhile, the tone is that the Czechs have also taken a step backwards, or at least half a step backwards, and the tone in the member states is now more likely to be that full cannabis legalisation would be stomped out by the ECJ (European Court of Justice). Even if some experts repeatedly say there are one or two loopholes through which it could at least be tried, do you share the view that it is rather very, very difficult to actually fully legalise cannabis in a member state without adjusting European law?
René Repasi: Yes, I think that European law and sensible policy are at odds with each other here. There is a good reason why we have taken the legalisation route, because we have learned from the Netherlands that decriminalisation or non-prosecution there has simply led to the situation not improving, but rather that crime has increased. The legalisation approach is precisely the one that achieves the right goal, that we legalize cannabis and at the same time have all the measures in place to counteract an increase in crime. That is why it is the right thing to do politically. European law still breathes the spirit of the 20th century in the implementation of the relevant UN conventions. We have the Schengen Convention, which classifies cannabis as a drug which is therefore a prohibited good that cannot be traded across borders. We then have the famous framework decision on drug trafficking, which closes the doors under criminal law wherever they can be closed. And in a case from the 2010s concerning access to coffee shops in Maastricht, the ECJ clearly ruled that cannabis is an illegal product and therefore has no protection under European law. From this, one can indeed conclude that if European law is not changed, the ECJ will probably put up a stop sign. Now, unlike in Holland, the federal government has ensured that at least cultivation, production and distribution can be decriminalised and monitored, which should hopefully prevent the kind of mafia-like structures that are sometimes said to exist in Holland. Nevertheless, some say it is somehow neither one thing nor the other. And the SPD is now going further. In the first draft of the election program, cannabis, or at least cannabis regulation, was not properly mentioned, and then in the second, a very decisive sentence was added at the party congress, namely that it wants European law-compliant legalisation.
Moritz Förster: In the first draft of the election manifesto, cannabis, or at least cannabis regulation, was not really mentioned and then, in the second draft at the party conference, a very decisive sentence was added, namely that it wants legalisation in line with European law. Were you surprised by this sentence?
René Repasi: No, I wasn’t surprised by it. We already had this sentence in the European election programme, which was by the way, much less controversial and easier to get into than it was in the Bundestag election programme, although I am also a member in the notorious motions committee of the federal party on behalf of the SPD state association of Baden-Württemberg. This sentence came in through the motions committee, and I was part of those who argued that we need clarification here, because if we suddenly drop this sentence, even though it was in the European election program, and then have such a somewhat strange formulation on dealing with drugs in the Bundestag election programme, the wrong conclusions could be drawn. The party leadership clearly said, no, there is absolutely no intention to deviate, and therefore it was not so difficult to get this sentence included.
Moritz Förster: And that is also the decisive sentence.
René Repasi: Yes, if we get the foundations of European law changed, then we can continue along the German path. That is, so to speak, the good thing in the bad news of the European legal situation. We do not have to change the treaties for this, because that would be the end of the road, you would never get that done, but we have to change the simple law, the secondary law of the EU, and in all areas where we have to change the law, a qualified majority of the member states is sufficient to get it done. It is not unanimity, so it is not the case that one state can prevent everything, but you can enact real policy. But that’s drilling through thick planks and you can’t let up, so to speak. And in this respect, just as you said, this is the decisive sentence with which we, on the one hand, commit ourselves to what we have done in the traffic light government, but on the other hand also make it clear that we want to continue working on this in order to find the big solution.
Moritz Förster: To be honest, I was also somewhat surprised when I saw that the FDP and the Greens had taken up the issue directly in the first drafts and the SPD, I think it was before Christmas, had not yet addressed it in the first draft. You said yourself that it was obviously on the table, because it was also on the agenda for the European elections, so it must have been an issue. What were the reservations about making a really clear commitment to it in the first draft? Was it somehow about a small backdoor towards coalition negotiations with the CDU, as was rumoured in the cannabis scene?
René Repasi: No, that wasn’t the point. The basic approach of the parliamentary election programme was to keep it particularly small, not to make it too comprehensive, not to have several hundred pages. And the basic approach issued by the Secretary-General Matthias Miersch was that everything we have done in the past, that we stand by it and that it is self-evident, and therefore only what we wanted to do differently in the future should be written in the programme. And that is why he did not mention the point, because he was simply of the opinion that we have done it, we’ll stick with it and move on. In the course of the programme’s creation, however, other points came in where people were proud of the past and wanted to continue with it, i.e. the logic was broken. And then, as I said, there was a somewhat complicated sentence on the regulation of drugs, which then led to completely false conclusions in this context. And then it was also easy to say to Miersch, look, we have already broken the basic idea here, so it becomes misleading. Why should we actually let a misunderstanding arise at all with a success of this government, of which we can also be proud? And that was quickly understood, so it was also easy to get the clarification into the programme. But the fact that this was not in this first version has something to do with the somewhat lofty approach of wanting to put a very slim election programme on the table. But there is no backdoor. They do not want to have an opening towards the CDU at that point in the election programme. And this is guaranteed to be one of the tough negotiating points if we are embarrassed to enter into coalition negotiations with the CDU.
Moritz Förster: I also had a bit of a stomach ache over one sentence. It doesn’t explicitly say that we are committed to the CanG, i.e. to decriminalisation as we have implemented it, but we want legalisation in line with European law. But if I understand you correctly, we can reassure all the people in the cannabis industry who are attached to the CanG. Namely that the CanG is not up for debate on the part of the SPD.
René Repasi: Yes, on the part of the SPD, it is not up for debate.
Moritz Förster: And in the event of tough coalition negotiations with the CDU, where do you think the SPD is most likely to be willing to make the CanG more restrictive?
René Repasi: Homegrow, clubs, medicinal cannabis, the pilot projects – Play has now said again that this will probably not happen before the election, so they are still up in the air anyway.
Moritz Förster: Where do you think there is a willingness to talk and could there be some readjustment in terms of a conservative government, if it is led by a conservative party, or a conservative coalition partner? We don’t yet know how the election will turn out.
René Repasi: Yes, that is the one-million-dollar question. Because it is already the case that if you simply take off your ideological glasses and look at what is in the CanG, you can already ask yourself why, as a conservative, you should actually have problems with it. After all, it is already extremely limited, namely because European law already sets such hard hurdles. We actually only do things within the framework of, well, what is possible privately and what is possible within the framework of pilot projects that have yet to be evaluated. And where it is also quite clear that if nothing changes in European law by the end of the evaluation of the pilot projects, then the path is also over. Because we have made use of the opening to provide for exceptions to the criminal offence for scientific and research purposes. That was done. But according to the ECJ, this is something that must be time-bound and cannot run without time limits. Against this background, it is a little difficult to see where there is actually any room for manoeuvre if you don’t want to take an axe to the entire law. And in this respect, yes, I don’t want to anticipate any negotiations at all. At the moment, I find it difficult to see how we can become more restrictive without, as I said, having to get to the essence of the law. The CDU has said that they want to completely return to the status quo before the CanG.
Moritz Förster: I find that quite difficult. The clubs have started up. People are already growing at home. The clubs have also signed contracts under certain conditions. It is no longer a BTM. Transferring it back into the BTM… how easy or difficult would such a step be?
René Repasi: Yes, that would be very difficult, because there are also constitutional limits. You have described it exactly. Contracts have been concluded here. There is something like a protection of legitimate expectations. And that means that the legal situation, at least for the past, must not change anyway. And in this respect, a retroactive repeal of the law would already be overturned by the Federal Constitutional Court. So, what already exists cannot be cancelled. As I said, it would not stand up in the German courts. The question is rather how one wants to make things more restrictive again, if one wanted to, within the framework of the CanG itself. Legislatively speaking, there is little to be said against adopting the radical solution you have just described. But in realpolitik, that is not very likely for the reasons I mentioned. We have made a lane change that is already being implemented. That means that if it should become more restrictive, it will most likely be within the framework of the CanG itself. And indeed not the complete rollback as it was in the past. People like to say things like that during election campaigns because they want to flex their muscles in front of their own electorate. But in practice, things look very different. But it still does not change the fact that one has to be extremely vigilant there. Because we do not want to make the rollback again.
Moritz Förster: Let’s move on to the other point you mentioned, namely legalisation in line with European law and the policy process that is actually associated with it. That is something where not everyone really knows how the whole thing can work at all. And you have already shed some light on the matter in a YouTube post that illustrates very clearly what would have to happen. I myself was a bit surprised by this term, also for a second reason, namely I find it very difficult to legalize in compliance with European law, because at least a majority would have to be found. If I am correctly informed with a proper legislative procedure, that is a simple majority represent 65 percent of the EU population.
René Repasi: Yes, not 55 members, because the EU doesn’t have that many, but 55 percent of the members.
Moritz Förster: Yes, of course, right, 55 percent of the members, yes. Given the slight shift to the right in the European institutions that has taken place, how good do you think the chances are that such majorities will materialise?
René Repasi: Exactly, the realpolitik question in Europe, that is the crucial question. So first of all, nothing happens anyway without the Commission doing something. The Commission has a monopoly on proposals, and without the Commission making a proposal, nothing gets moving. However, we are seeing movement. I don’t know to what extent this is known, but I suspect it is, because the movement is being formulated very precisely and closely monitored. We have a public consultation by the European Commission on the so-called evaluation of the Framework Decision 2004-757 on drug trafficking. It is precisely this framework decision, which sets out the dimensions here, that is currently running until 14 February. Anyone can submit an opinion on whether it is suitable or not. And on the basis of these opinions, the Commission will then evaluate this legal act and come up with concrete proposals. They will be announced for the second quarter of 2026. So if the Commission is given this framework, the machine would start up in the second quarter of 2026. If we now look at the overall situation in the Council, it is indeed difficult. Among the countries that have already gone down the legalisation route themselves, even those countries that have only gone down the decriminalisation or opportunity route, we still don’t have a qualified majority. In other words, the countries that have done it under national law, when they get together, are not enough. So others are also needed to do this. And that is indeed the big problem. We also have the situation that Germany’s neighbouring countries are afraid of cross-border drug trafficking and may therefore be more restrictive than their political convictions. For example, in the case of Denmark, where appropriate measures must be taken to consult with the governments of neighbouring countries so that at least the neighbouring countries are still on board. But it is clear that we are currently far from a qualified majority. That is the reason why I once proposed that we turn it around. That we don’t want to have Europe-wide legalisation, so to speak, because we have many major reservations about it, but that we include an exemption clause that allows Germany to legalise for the German federal territory and makes it easier for some Member States to say, okay, if the Germans want it, they can have it. But then it is only legal on German territory, but must not go into the internal market free trade, i.e., across borders. And then I can continue to decide for my own country that I want it differently.
Moritz Förster: I still believe that this is a variant where we can get a qualified majority because legalisation is not imposed on other countries in quotation marks. Would that also be compatible with Schengen?
René Repasi: It would be compliant. Because Schengen is secondary law, so if we look at the hierarchy of European law, we have the treaties at the top, which is primary law. And at the bottom we have secondary law, which is simple law. The Schengen Convention, even if it is called a convention, it used to be a convention from the 1990s, but has now been transferred to secondary law. This means that it has the status of secondary law. The Framework Decision has the status of secondary legislation. This means that we can also amend it with secondary legislation. There is then nothing in the treaties. The treaties do not address the issue of cannabis. And accordingly, secondary legislation can define what is a legal or illegal commodity. And if we legalise at the level of secondary law, so to speak, and then possibly only partially legalise it, then the secondary legislator says, okay, I’ll do that here. And that would therefore be a feasible way forward, which would in any case be compatible with Schengen.
Moritz Förster: And what do you think about the situation in the Parliament?
René Repasi: I imagine this to be incredibly difficult, because it may well be that conservative representatives from progressive cannabis countries are more willing to agree to such an adjustment than social democratic representatives from more restrictive countries, for example from Scandinavian or Eastern European countries.
Moritz Förster: How do you assess this? How can you get a feel for the voting behaviour of the members in the event of the Commission taking the next steps?
René Repasi: Yes, you have indeed described it correctly. The situation in the European Parliament is such that we can’t really think along party lines on this issue, but that it goes all the way through. In the old mandate, we had a group of friends of cannabis legalisation with representatives from the extreme right to the extreme left. And we had a representative of a Dutch right-wing party from the ECR group, i.e. Mrs Meloni’s group, who was a strong advocate of legalisation and worked within her own group. That’s why the situation is exactly as you describe it. And that makes the majorities somewhat difficult to predict. That’s the reason why we have to launch something like a test balloon in Parliament. In Parliament, we have the possibility for committees to propose so-called own-initiative reports. These are non-legislative reports in which the political position of the European Parliament is defined. We like to do this at the beginning of a legislative period in order to send political messages to the Commission.
Moritz Förster: Okay, if you make this and that proposal, then you can already count on a majority here in the house because we have already managed to do it politically. And you would have to use such an own-initiative report to test the waters, so to speak.
René Repasi: This is, as I said, harmless because if it doesn’t work, then nothing is lost. But if it works, the Commission knows for sure that it will not run into a brick wall in Parliament. So, and that would have to come from either the Internal Affairs Committee or the Health Committee. We can also try to make a statement in a report that somehow deals with this topic on a large scale, in view of the expected changes to the framework agreement, which I have just reported on, it is very likely that Parliament will do something to, as I said, test the majorities in order to see where further work needs to be done to change things. It is true that the progressive side is of course much more open to legalisation than the conservative side, so that we in the German SPD group within our own S&D Group have to enter into discussions with the national delegations, which are somewhat more critical, as you mentioned, especially the Scandinavian delegations, in order to achieve a somewhat unified position within the group. The same applies to Liberals, Greens, and Leftists. even under the current more right-wing European Parliament, if there are smaller groups in the far-right groups that support this against the background of their national characteristics, there could well be a majority in the European Parliament. In other words, my assessment is that it should be easier to have a majority in Parliament than a qualified majority in the Council.
Moritz Förster: If the right vote is then taken and the majorities are not achieved, then the issue is off the table for the next few years, isn’t it?
René Repasi: That is indeed the case because then the proposal is rejected, and the Commission would have to restart the process. And with every start of a process, the Commission analyzes how likely it is to succeed because, as I said, it doesn’t want to get a bloody nose. And if it has gotten one once, it will probably wait several years, if not a decade, before trying again.
Moritz Förster: That means a good test result, whenever that happens, would be very, very important to give the Commission enough incentive and also enough security to initiate the legislative procedure at all.
René Repasi: That’s right, so in order to provide the Commission with appropriate assistance, it would have to be done by the end of 2025, early 2026, more likely the end of 2025, if the timetable remains that they actually want to make a proposal in the second quarter of 2026, then they should already know a few months in advance how much they can or cannot go out on a limb at that point.
Moritz Förster: I always had the feeling that not much has happened at the European level in recent years. There were always these informal meetings that Burkhard Blienert also played a key role in driving forward. What role did they play as preparation for such a policy process?
René Repasi: Yes, they were very, very important and very, very central. So it’s good that Burkhard is someone who knows how European policy processes work. In principle, you have to start by convincing Commission officials. And he has done this meticulously. And these are the people who started this consultation and who are looking at it. And that’s why it was very, very important, because the Commission then became aware of the problem to a certain extent. Of course, they will now look very closely at what is happening in Germany. If the future coalition agreement switches off the lights, then the Commission will no longer dare to do anything. Because if they also lose Germany in the Council, then they know that it is not crowned with success. In this respect, people will look to Germany. But the groundwork that Blienert has laid here with his preliminary talks has certainly been accomplished. And above all, we now need the signal from the coalition agreement so that the Commission then dares to take the next steps.
Moritz Förster: René, it is incredibly difficult to make predictions at the moment because there are so many uncertainties. Do you still want to venture a guess and estimate when the first country in the EU will have fully legalized a cannabis value chain as a recreational product?
René Repasi: Fully legalised? Wow, that’s really difficult because, as I said, it will depend on when we get a green light under European law. What’s more, the country that does this must also withdraw from all UN agreements. In procedural terms, that is somewhat easier than changing European law. It’s all conditional. So, let’s say, if I were an optimist, the Commission actually proposes something like this in the second quarter of 2026, then a legislative procedure, if it runs reasonably smoothly, which is not very likely in this area, but let’s say it will be completed in two years, we would have 2028, and then it can be implemented. In this respect, one could probably name the period 2029-2030 to legalize the law. The exception for scientific and research purposes remains, including the path that the Netherlands has taken, and nobody knows exactly how long the time limit may actually be, 10 years, 20 years. In this respect, there are also leeway that can be tested, with which you can already fully legalize in anticipation of what may come, but then of course take the risk. And it is precisely when you take risks that such discussions are important, because if the Commission does not initiate infringement proceedings, there is no one to say that this is in breach of European law. And in this respect, a Commission can also tolerate something like this being done. However, if you want to be on the safe side, it is better to talk about the period mentioned.
Moritz Förster: Yes, I find the aforementioned weed experiment in the Netherlands very exciting, because all adults, at least those residing in the Netherlands, can actually obtain legally produced, legally distributed, controlled cannabis recreationally in 10 cities. So it’s actually on a scale that goes far beyond what we see in Switzerland, for example. So that’s something to keep an eye on to see how it develops.
René Repasi: Exactly, and in this case, too, that is precisely what happened, that the representatives of the Dutch government communicated closely with the Commission in advance that the Commission would not do anything about it.
Moritz Förster: Good news for all listeners. With the SPD in the next government, the CanG will not be revoked. René, you have assured us of this once again in a credible manner. We are happy about that. And so, if the SPD is part of the government, Germany will remain a very important player for a complete legalisation in line with European law, possibly in a few years’ time. We are excited to see how the whole election turns out and what the future will show us. Thank you very, very much, René, for reporting to us today on what is happening at European level, because this is often given far too little attention.
René Repasi: You’re welcome. Thank you for the conversation.
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